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Singapore's Puzzling Embrace of
Shareholder Stewardship: A

Successful Secret
Dan W. Puchniak* & Samantha S. Tang**
ABSTRACT

In the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the
United Kingdom created the first stewardship code, which was

designed to transform its rationally passive institutional
investors into actively engaged shareholders. In the UK corporate

governance context, this idea made sense. Institutionalinvestors
collectively own a sizable majority of the shares in most of the
United Kingdom's listed companies. In turn, if the UK
stewardship code could incentivize them to effectively monitor
management to act as "good shareholder stewards"-the

managerialshort-termism and excessive risk-taking, which were
identified as contributors to the GFC, could be avoided.
The United Kingdom's idea to adopt a stewardship code

sparked

a

global

shareholder stewardship

movement.

Unsurprisingly, Singapore as a corporate governance leader in
Asia, adopted a stewardship code. Based on a superficial textual
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analysis, the Singapore Code appears to be a near carbon copy of

the UK Code. However, this Article, which provides the first indepth

comparative analysis of stewardship in

Singapore,

demonstrates how Singapore has turned the UK model of
stewardship on its head. Rather than enhancing the shareholder

voice of institutionalinvestors, shareholderstewardship has been
used in Singaporeas a mechanism for entrenching its successful
state-controlled and family-controlled system of corporate
governance. This development has been entirely overlooked by

prominent international observers and would be beyond the
wildest imaginations of the original architects of the UK Code.
Viewed through an Anglo-American lens, this use of
"stewardship"may suggest that Singapore has engaged in a
corporate governance sham. However, this Article argues the
opposite: it appears to be a secret to Singapore's continued
corporategovernance success andprovides a much-needed Asian
(as opposed to Anglo-American) model of good corporate

governance for Asia.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the creation of the world's first stewardship code by the

United

Kingdom

(UK

Code)

sparked

widespread

interest

in

1
stewardship around the globe. As an Asian tiger economy, which has

established itself as a corporate governance leader, 2 Singapore
proposed its own version of a stewardship code in 2016. Stewardship
3
Asia, as a Singapore incorporated entity with the stated mission of
promoting stewardship in Singapore and Asia, thus introduced the
"Stewardship Principles for Responsible Investors" (Singapore

&

See Jennifer G. Hill, Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International
1.
Stewardship Codes, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 497, 506-13 (2018); Q&A on Stewardship
Codes, ERNST & YOUNG (Aug. 2017), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLLJAssets/eystewardship-codes-august-2017/$FILE/ey-stewardship-codes-august-2017.pdf
fhttps://perma.cc/H5JX-DL7L] (archived Jan. 27, 2020) [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG];
Kerrie Waring, Investor stewardship and future priorities, ETHICAL BD. RooM (2017),
https://ethicalboardroom.com/investor-stewardship-and-future-priorities/
[https://perma.cc/2FT5-YF92] (archived Jan. 27, 2020); see also Siobhan Riding
Jennifer Thompson, Chinese governance raises red flags, FIN. TIMES (June 1, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/10001b4c-82e8- 1 1e9-b592-5fe435b57a3b
[https:/Iperma.cc/QJ2S-UC5F] (archived Jan. 27, 2020); Katherine Sung, Regime Change
Begins at Home: China's New Governance Code, GLASS LEWIS (Oct. 4, 2018),
https:/www. glasslewis.com/regime-change-begins-at-home-chinas-new-governancecode/ [https:/Iperma.cc/V6BX-4WDS] (archived Jan. 27, 2020).
See, e.g., Dan W. Puchniak & Umakanth Varottil, Related Party Transactions
2.
in Commonwealth Asia: Complexity Revealed 2-3 (European. Corp. Governance Inst.
2018),
404,
No.
Paper
Working
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.Cfm?abstract id=3169760 [https://perma.cc/Q2Y9HTMZ] (archived Jan. 27, 2020); DoING BUSINESS 2019: TRAINING FOR REFORM, WORLD
BANK 5 (2019), https://www.doingbusiness-org/en/reports/global-reports/doing-business2019 [https://perma.ce/5YUE-BD7F] (archived Jan. 27, 2020) [hereinafter WORLD BANK
TRAINING] (ranking Singapore second in the "Ease of Doing Business' ranking);
WORLD
BANK,
MINORITY
INVESTORS,
PROTECTING
https://www doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploretopics/protecting-aminority-investors (last
visited Mar. 18, 2020) [https://perma.cc/372M-BXGU] (archived Jan. 27, 2020)
[hereinafter WORLD BANK PROTECTING] (ranking Singapore seventh in minority
shareholder protection); Alun John, Japan Slides in Key Asia Corporate Governance
Ranking, Ties With India, REUTERS (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/asiagovernance/j apan-slides-in-key-asia-corporate-governance-ranking-ties-with-indiaidUSL4N1YA175 (ranking Singapore third in a biennial survey on corporate governance
by the Asian Corporate Governance Association and CLSA) [https://perma.cc/B78DG64P] (archived Jan. 27, 2020).
ACCOUNTING & CORP. REGULATORY AUTH. OF SING. (2017) (on file with
3.
author) (discussing how Stewardship Asia Centre CLG Limited is a public company
limited by guarantee incorporated in Singapore on March 28, 2017).
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Stewardship Code or the Singapore Code) 4 ostensibly modeled on the
UK Code.5
However, there are strong reasons to doubt the relevance of the

UK concept of shareholder stewardship to Singapore considering its
shareholder landscape. Unlike the United Kingdom, most shares in
Singapore's listed companies are not owned by institutional
shareholders. 6 Instead, Singapore is dominated by companies with
controlling-block shareholders able to directly monitor management or
manage the company themselves.7 A significant majority of its listed
companies are family firms, whose corporate governance is dominated
by family members through their shareholder voting rights. 8 Aside
from family firms, the Singapore government-through its privately

incorporated holding company Temasek-controls the voting rights in
most of Singapore's largest listed companies.9 Institutional investors
have played, and continue to play, only a minor role in Singapore
corporate governance, especially when compared to state and family

controlling shareholders.1 0

percent of market capitalization weighted ownership)

.

4.
SINGAPORE STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTORS,
STEWARDSHIP
ASIA
CTR.
(Nov.
2016),
http://www.stewardshipasia.com.sg/sites/default/files/Section%202%20%20SSP%20(Full%20Document).pdf [https://perma.cc/L3BZ-BF69] (archived Jan 27,
2020) [hereinafter SINGAPORE STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES].
See ERNEST LIM, A CASE FOR SHAREHOLDERS' FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN COMMON
5.
LAW ASIA 280 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2019) (characterizing the Singapore Stewardship
Code as being "inspired" by the UK Code).
Adriana De La Cruz et al., Owners of the World's Listed Companies, OECD
6.
CAPITAL. MKT. SERIES 12, 36, 37 (2019), http://www.oecd.org/corporate/Owners-of-theWorlds-Listed-Companies.pdf [https://perma.c/MA5X-KVQT] (archived Mar. 18, 2020)
(using an analysis of 195 listed companies representing eighty-three percent of total
market capitalization in Singapore, finding that institutional investors held twelve
7.
Luh Luh Lan & Umakanth Varottil, ShareholderEmpowerment in Controlled
Companies: The Case of Singapore, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF SHAREHOLDER POWER
573, 575-78 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., Elgar Publishing 2015); Tan
Cheng Han et al., State-Owned Enterprisesand the SingaporeModel, 28 COLUM. J. ASIAN
L. 61, 91 (2015). But see Dan W. Puchniak & Luh Luh Lan, Independent Directors in
Singapore:Puzzling Compliance Requiring Explanation, 65 Am. J. COMP. L. 265, 315-16
(2017) (arguing that this might not be the case for state-controlled companies, which
may rely on independent directors to perform monitoring functions).

8.

Marleen Dielman et al., Success and Succession: A Study of SGX-Listed

Family Firms, Centre for Governance, Institutions and Organisations,NAT'L UNIV. OF

SINGAPORE
BUS.
SCH.
8
(2013),
https/hbschool.nus.edusg/Portals/O/images/CGIO/Report/Asian%2OFamily%2OBusiness
%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/XV75-SHFB] (archived Jan. 27, 2020) (detailing that
about 60.8 percent of firms listed on the SGX Main Board and Catalist can be classified
as family firms from October 2010 to September 2011).
9. Isabel Sim et al., The State as Shareholder:The Case of Singapore, NUS BUs.
ScH.
6,
23-24
(2014),
https://bschool.nus.edu.sg/gio/wp-

content/uploads/sites/7/2018/10/SOE-The-State-as-Shareholder-2014.pdf
[https://perma.c/ZBH9-XYX5] (archived Jan, 27, 2020).
10.
De La Cruz et al., supra note 6, at 36, 37; Lan & Varottil, supra note 7 at,
575-78; Tan et al., supra note 7, at 91.
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In this context, the primary concerns that spawned the creation of

the UK Code in 2010 following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC)
excessive risk-taking and short-termism by management left
unmonitored because rationally apathetic institutional investors
controlled the shareholder float"--are virtually absent in Singapore.
Further, the very solution proposed by the UK Code to address
institutional investor apathy-to incentivize institutional investors to
12
take a more active role in corporate governance -is less relevant in
Singapore listed companies, where institutional investors are a
minority in the face of controlling
comparatively powerless
shareholders. This raises the first puzzle: Why did Singapore adopt a

stewardship

code which was ostensibly modeled on the United

Kingdom, when it lacks the corporate governance problems that the
UK Code was designed to address and the potential for the solution it
aims to provide?
A closer examination of the Singapore Stewardship Code reveals
a further puzzle: by comparison to the UK Code-and indeed many
other stewardship codes-Singapore's Code is curiously toothless. 13
The very title of the Singapore Code-"Singapore Stewardship
that the
Principles for Institutional Investors"-demonstrates
Singapore
the
Singapore Code is not actually a "code" at all. Rather,
Code is a set of "principles" that are intended to provide "useful
14
guidance" for institutional investors. Notwithstanding the different
terminology used, this set of principles is analyzed as a "code" for two
reasons. First, the Singapore Code is almost uniformly referred to as a
"code" by international organizations, scholars, business analysts, and
journalists and is often compared to other stewardship codes around
the world. 15 Second, the text of the Singapore Code bears a close

See, e.g., Iris H.Y. Chiu & Dionysia Katelouzou, From Shareholder
11.
Stewardshipto ShareholderDuties:Is the Time Ripe?, in SHAREHOLDER DUTIES 131, 131
(Hanne S. Birkmose ed., 2017); Paul Davies, Shareholders in the United Kingdom, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 355, 373 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S.
Thomas eds., 2015); Brian R. Cheffins, The Stewardship Code's Achilles' Heel, 73 MOD.
L. REv. 1004, 1005-06 (2010).
12. Cheffins; supra note 11, at 1014-15.
LIM, supra note 5, at 288-89 ("[T]here is no evidence that a key objective of
13.
the codes - to promote and protect the long-term success of the investee companies - has
been met.... The first problem is that none of the codes (HKPRO, SSP and MCII) are
binding; they operate on a purely voluntary basis. Failure by institutional shareholders
to sign up or apply the code (after signing up) are met with no penalties or sanctions
. In Singapore, the situation is arguably worse [than Hong Kong's
whatsoever
stewardship code].").
SINGAPORE STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at 4.
14.
See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 1; Hill, supra note 1, at 497; LIM, supra
15.
note 5, at 288-89; see also Dionysia Katelouzou & Mathias Siems, The Global Diffusion
of Stewardship Codes, in GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER STEWARDSHIP: COMPLEXITIES,
CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES (Dionysia Katelouzou & Dan W. Puchniak eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming 2021).
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resemblance to the language used in the UK Code1 6 and other codes
around the world.17
The Singapore Code provides that all institutional investors
(including domestic ones) are free to adopt the Singapore Stewardship
Code in whole, in part, or not at all; compliance is entirely voluntary.' 8
Institutional investors who "support"1 9 the Singapore Code are not
required to provide any evidence of compliance with it. 20 The
impotence of Singapore's code is accentuated by the fact that-in
contrast to many existing codes 2 '-it has no mechanism whatsoever to
monitor whether "supporters" have actually complied with the
Singapore Code. 22 Moreover, the entity that spearheaded and
promotes the Singapore Code, Stewardship Asia, is a private entity
that has absolutely no regulatory power to supervise the
implementation of the code or enforce it.2 3 The Singapore Code does
not even provide a singular model or template of what stewardship
means as it encourages those who opt to follow it to "take steps to
satisfy themselves that they adhere to their own stewardship

16.
See infra Part II. Compare SINGAPORE STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES, supranote
4,
at
4,
with
UK
STEWARDSHIP
CODE,
FIN.
REPORTING
COUNCIL,
https://www.frc.org.uk/investors/uk-stewardship-code
(last visited Mar. 30, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/6Z4T-GR8C] (archived Jan. 27, 2020).
17.
Katelouzou & Siems, supra note 15.
18. SINGAPORE STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at 3 ("[The Principles]
are not intended to be rigid rules to be enforced or prescriptive measures to be adhered
to, nor are they intended to constitute a code."); Press Release, Stewardship Asia,

Stewardship for Singapore Investors: A Matter of Principles (Nov. 2, 2016) (on file with
Stewardship Asia Ctr.).
19.

It appears that Stewardship Asia has used the term 'supporters' rather than

signatories' to demonstrate the relaxed nature of the commitment that is required by
institutional investors. Id.

20.
See Singapore Stewardship Principles - Intent, STEWARDSHIP ASIA CTR.,
https://www.stewardshipasia.comssg/intent
(last
visited
Mar.
18,
2020)
[https://perma.cc/LRD5-RSVL]
(archived Jan. 27, 2020) ('The SSP [Singapore
Stewardship Principles] is not enforced or audited.").
21.
See LIST OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS SIGNING UP TO "PRINCIPLES FOR
RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS", FIN. SERVS. AGENCY (Dec. 14, 2018),
https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/stewardship/20181214/en list_01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/98GE-IADF] (archived Jan. 27, 2020) (showing Japan's Financial
Services Agency's recording keeping of the signatories to the Code); Tiering of
Stewardship
Code
Signatories,
FIN.
REPORTING
COUNCIL,
https://www.fre.org.uk/investors/uk-stewardship-code/uk-stewardship-code-statements
(last visited Mar. 18, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ACC8-VW6B] (archived Jan. 27, 2020)
(showing a list of asset owners, asset managers and service providers that have
published a statement on their compliance or otherwise with the Code as well as requests
that signatories notify the FRC when they have done so, and when the statement is
updated).
22.
See SINGAPORE STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at 6 (urging
responsible investors establish and articulate their policies on their stewardship
responsibility).
23.
Singapore's equivalent to the Financial Reporting Council (UK) or the
Financial Services Agency (Japan) would be the Monetary Authority of Singapore, or the
Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority.
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approach." 24 For a jurisdiction that consistently tops Asian corporate
governance rankings-and which regularly ranks as a global leader for

its efficient business regulation and good corporate governance 25-why
did Singapore introduce a code that provides no singular model of
stewardship, no method of determining who has complied with the code
and, in turn, no functional mechanism to significantly increase
transparency or market pressure on institutional investors to act as
"good stewards"? This is the second puzzle this Article seeks to solve.
Having introduced an apparently impotent stewardship code for
institutional investors, in late 2018 Stewardship Asia proceeded to
introduce yet another stewardship code in Singapore-only this time
directed at family companies. The Singapore Family Stewardship
Code2 6 is a version of the Singapore Stewardship Code developed for
family companies, and is, to the best of our knowledge, the first (and,
as of late 2019, the only) one of its kind in the world. Stewardship Asia
has been actively publicizing the Family Stewardship Code to
jurisdictions in Asia to promote Singapore as a hub for corporate
28
governance. 27 Directed at family businesses, the Singapore Family
Stewardship Code encourages family shareholders to be good
"stewards" of their companies.2 9 It is noteworthy, however, that this

code does

not contemplate

divestment

of control

to nonfamily

shareholders, but rather promotes the entrenchment of family
control.3 0 Further, the Singapore Family Stewardship Code does not
appear to actively encourage or facilitate the involvement of

institutional investors or shareholder activists in Singapore family
companies.3 1 The vision of "stewardship" at the heart of the Family
Stewardship Code thus appears to be dramatically different from the
concept of institutional investor "stewardship" that is fundamental to
the UK Code. This gives rise to the third puzzle: Why did Singapore
introduce a second stewardship code addressed to family controlling
shareholders-a constituency that was not contemplated by the UK
Code, let alone any other stewardship code introduced to date?
This Article offers explanations to these three puzzles, which may
be briefly summarized as follows. As to the first puzzle,

24.

SINGAPORE STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLEs, supra note 4, at 6 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., WORLD BANK TRAINING, supra note 2, at 5 (ranking Singapore second
25.
in "Ease of Doing Business"); WORLD BANK PROTECTING, supra note 2 (ranking
Singapore seventh in minority shareholder protection); Puchniak & Lan, supra note 7,
at 288.
26.
See STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR FAMILY BUSINESSEs, STEWARDSHIP ASIA
https://www.stewardshipasia.com-sg/sites/default/files/SSP-brochure(2018),
CTR.
0913_approved%20for%20printing.pdf [https://perma.ccYEL5-K2F7] (archived Jan. 27,
2020) [hereinafter STEWARDSHIP ASIA FAMILY].
27.
See id. at 1 (noting the importance and relevance of family business in Asia).
28. Id. at 1.
29.
See id. at 4, 6 (references "family owners").
Id. at 7.
30.
31.
See infra Part IV.
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notwithstanding the limited relevance and impotence of institutional
investors to Singapore listed companies, Singapore nonetheless
adopted a stewardship code ostensibly modeled after the UK Code as a
form of "halo signaling," demonstrating Singapore's commitment to
Anglo-American-cum-global
standards
of
good
corporate
governance.,32 The answer to the second puzzle-the comparatively

"toothless" Singapore Stewardship Code-appears to follow naturally
from this. Since Singapore neither suffers from the problems nor
possesses the ability to implement the solutions that the UK concept
of stewardship prescribes, Singapore has no need for a stewardship
code with actual "bite." It also has a strong incentive to create a code
that allows institutional investors (and family firms) to comply with it
effortlessly, which helps promote Singapore as a jurisdiction that is
easy to do business in.
But that is only scratching the surface. Diving deeper, a careful
examination of the relationship between Singapore's state investment
arm (Temasek), which is also the controlling shareholder of most of
Singapore's largest listed companies, and Stewardship Asia reveals
another driving force behind the Singapore Code. This Article provides
the first analysis of the link between Stewardship Asia, the ostensibly
private entity that designed and promotes the code, and the Singapore
state. This link is crucial because it explains how the entity writing the
rules for how institutional investors should engage with controlling
shareholders (i.e., Stewardship Asia), is itself an arm of Singapore's
most powerful controlling shareholder: the Singapore government
through its wholly owned holding company Temasek. 33
In this context, it makes perfect sense that the Singapore Code is
not designed to disrupt the status quo of the corporate controller or
promote powerful shareholder activism. To the contrary, the code is
designed to maintain the existing corporate governance environment
for corporate controllers-which are the state and wealthy families in
Singapore. 34 Importantly, however, there is an institutional
architecture in Singapore that serves as a functional substitute for
shareholder activism in Singapore's state-owned enterprises.35 This
prevents the type of wealth-reducing private benefits of control from

being

extracted

by

Temasek

from

Singapore's

state-owned

enterprises-something that may otherwise be expected in a market

32.
Puchniak & Lan, supra note 7, at 288.
33.
TEMASEK
OVERVIEW,
TEMASEK
REVIEW
42-43
(2019),
https://www.temasekreviewcom.sg/downloads/Temasek-Review-2019-Overview.pdf
lhttps//perma.cc/7EYB-RBJX] (archived Jan. 27, 2020).
See infra Part Ill.
34.
35.
See Puchniak & Lan, supra note 7, at 332 (noting Singapore has developed a
unique functional substitute to mitigate private benefits of control and kept it in check);
Tan et al., supra note 7, at 67-69 (summarizing empirical studies on the performance of
Singapore state-owned enterprises).
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devoid of shareholder activists and in which the government is both
36
the regulator and the most powerful shareholder.
In addition, by releasing the first stewardship code through
Stewardship Asia, the Singapore government took control of this
regulatory space and prevented "bottom-up" free-market based
approaches to shareholder stewardship-which could have been more
unpredictable and potentially disruptive to Singapore's successful
corporate governance model-from developing. This act of what this
Article coins "preemptive corporate governance" has allowed the
government to maintain its existing corporate governance regime,
while at the same time allowing Singapore to maintain its position as
an Asian and global corporate governance leader by embracing the
rising international trend of "shareholder stewardship."
The third puzzle represented by Singapore's Family Stewardship
Code can be untangled with a careful examination of the code itself,
and the importance and function of family-controlled companies in
Singapore and Asia. This Article demonstrates that the Family
Stewardship Code is a strategic effort by Stewardship Asia to put
forward a version of stewardship adapted to Singapore's successful
corporate environment and to address the practical corporate
governance issues faced by Asian jurisdictions, which are often distinct
from those reflected in the Anglo-American paradigm. The concept of
"family stewardship" at the core of the Family Stewardship Code is
entirely distinct from the concept, form, and substance of
"stewardship" espoused in the UK Code. The only meaningful
resemblance is in the use of the term "stewardship," which is now
enshrined as a term in the global lexicon for good corporate
governance. This is in line with Singapore's general approach to
formally adopting global norms of good corporate governance as a form
of "halo signaling," while functionally maintaining its successful family
and state-controlled system of corporate governance. 3 However,
interestingly, it appears to perhaps go a step further than past reforms
by suggesting a model of corporate governance specifically tailored to
Asia-and which is distinct from the traditional Anglo-American
model-with Singapore strategically positioned as the standardbearer for Asia. This approach may be opportunistically timed as the
world is potentially shifting from an era of globalism to one of
regionalism, especially in Asia.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes Singapore's
shareholder landscape and explains Singapore's adoption of a United
Kingdom-model stewardship code notwithstanding the impotence of
institutional shareholders. Part III demonstrates how Singapore's

Stewardship Code is "toothless" in comparison to the UK Code, and

36.
37.

33, at 43.
Puchniak & Lan, supra note 7, at 272.
TEMASEK OVERVIEW, supra note
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argues that this is a strategic arrangement designed to protect the
otherwise efficient status quo. Part IV explains Singapore's recently
introduced Family Stewardship Code and its significance to Singapore
and Asia. Part V concludes by explaining the significance of
Singapore's shareholder stewardship story in the context of the
broader field of comparative corporate law and governance.

II. THE

FIRST PUZZLE: WHY DID SINGAPORE ADOPT A STEWARDSHIP
CODE WHEN IT LACKS THE UNITED KINGDOM'S GOVERNANCE

PROBLEMS/SOLUTIONS?
A. The Premise of Modern Stewardship
The rise of institutional shareholders in the United Kingdom and
United States has commanded scholarly attention because of the
corporate governance challenges it poses. Most listed companies in the
United Kingdom and United States are no longer examples of the
dispersed
company with atomized,
archetypical Berle-Means
shareholders; now, in most listed companies, a modest number of major
institutional investors collectively hold a sufficient percentage of
shares to exercise effective control.3 8 This poses a seismic challenge to

the Anglo-American model of corporate governance founded on the
agency problem between shareholders and managers. While it is

possible for institutional investors to collectively exercise their voting
power to minimize shareholder-manager agency costs and act as "good
stewards" of their investee companies, institutional investors have
ordinarily no incentive to do so. 39 In fact, remaining passive is often
40
their best option to maximize profits.
In the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC),
institutional investors were criticized for failing to rein in the excessive
managerial risk-taking and short-termism in listed companies that
were arguably key causes of the GFC.41 In response, the United
Kingdom issued the world's first stewardship code in 2010 to create

38.
Lucian Bebchuk et al., The Agency Problems of InstitutionalInvestors, 31 J.
ECoN. PER$P. 89, 92-93 (2017); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffery N. Gordon, The Agency Costs
of Agency Capitalism;Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 863, 865, 874-76; Cheffins, supra note 11, at 1017-20; Davies, supra
note 11, at 357-58.
39.
See Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate
Governance: Theory, Evidence and Policy 119 CoLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2050 (2019). But see
Edward B. Rock & Marcel Kahan, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let
Shareholders Be Shareholders 18, 33-34, 42-44 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Working Paper,
2019) (arguing that index fund managers have incentives to invest in acquiring
company-specific information and engage in company-specific analysis).
40.
Bebchuk et al., supra note 38, at 96-100.
41.
See, e.g., Cheffins, supra note 11, at 1005-06; Chiu & Katelouzou, supra note
11, at 131; Davies, supra note 11, at 373;.
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incentives for institutional investors to act responsibly and engage
with management. 4 2 Based on this it can be seen that institutional
investors were arguably the problem addressed, and the solution

supplied, by the UK Code.4 3
In a jurisdiction where

institutional

shareholders

could

potentially wield considerable influence over the internal affairs of
substantial
of their collective
by virtue
companies
listed
shareholding, 44 there is a certain logic in crafting a stewardship code
premised on institutional investors being both the problem and the
solution. This was the case with the UK Code. With the corporate
governance challenges posed by institutional shareholders in the
United Kingdom (and the United States) well documented in the
Anglo-American-dominated corporate governance lay and scholarly
discourse, it is tempting to assume that similar problems are shared
by many other jurisdictions, and that solutions-stewardship codes
45
But is the underlying premisewould, barring obstacles, converge.
that other jurisdictions' corporate governance landscapes and
associated problems are on the whole similar-even valid to begin

with?
In contrast to the United Kingdom and United States, most listed
companies in other jurisdictions are under the de facto (if not outright
de jure) control of block shareholders that can be families, states, or
other corporations. In these jurisdictions, institutional shareholders

still control only a minority of the total voting power of listed
companies, even if their shareholdings have generally increased with
time.4 6 Consequently, institutional shareholders have limited power to

cause a change in corporate control or make a credible threat to do so.
Instead of an absent steward, the principal corporate governance
problem in these jurisdictions is an entrenched controlling shareholder
who may use their very real power not to discharge the function of a

42. Arad Reisberg, The UK Stewardship Code: On the Road to Nowhere?, 15 J.
CORP. L. STUD. 217, 221-22 (2015) (detailing that prior to the GFC, the Institutional
Shareholders' Committee had released a code for institutional investors in 1991).
Cheffins, supra note 11, at 1014-15.
43,
See generally OWNERSHIP OF UK QUOTED SHARES: 2016, OFFICE FOR NAT'L
44.
2017),
29,
(Nov.
STATIsTICS,
https:f/www.ons. gov.uk/economy/investmentspensionsandtrusts/bulletins/ownershipofu
kquotedshares/2016 [https://perma.cc/9JND-T5R7] (archived Jan. 27, 2020) (providing
the latest available figures); Davies, supra note 11, at 357-59.
45.
See infra Part I1.
See, e.g., Gen Goto, Legally "Strong"Shareholdersof Japan, 3 MICH. J. PRIV.
46.
EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 125, 144-45 (2014) (providing that while state and family
controlling shareholders do not generally dominate listed companies in Japan,
institutional investors do not collectively exercise majority control over most listed
companies); LIM, supra note 5, at 52-59 (discussing Malaysia and India).
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steward, but rather to extract private benefits of control at minority
shareholders' expense. 4 7
What about Singapore? As discussed in the next subpart,
Singapore is no exception to the general rule applying to jurisdictions
other than the United Kingdom and United States in that its listed

companies are dominated by block shareholders. In fact, Singapore
turns the conventional wisdom about the superiority of the AngloAmerican corporate governance model and the efficiency of dispersed
shareholding on its head. As Singapore has risen from a developing, to
developed, and now to one of the wealthiest and most sophisticated
economies in the world, its shareholder landscape has maintained-if

not increased-its

level

of concentration. 48 Further,

its state-

controlled and family-controlled corporations have outperformed
almost all others, dispelling the now anachronistic wisdom that statecontrolled and family-controlled companies are pitstops on the path
towards economic development. 4 9 In fact, the remarkable success of
Singapore's state-controlled companies has itself become a model for

developing

countries-particularly

China-to

follow.

50

Most

importantly from the perspective of the UK stewardship model, within
Singapore's shareholder landscape and corporate governance model,
institutional investors have played a de minimis role.51 In this context,
the introduction of a Singapore Stewardship Code, ostensibly modeled
on the UK Code, mystifies. The rest of this Part explains the unique
features of Singapore's institutional architecture and shareholder
landscape and discusses the relevance of Singapore's Stewardship

Code.
B. Illuminating Singapore'sInstitutionalArchitecture and
ShareholderLandscape
Instead of institutional shareholders such as banks pension
funds, and mutual funds, the dominant players in Singapore's listed

See Dan W. Puchniak, Multiple Faces of Shareholder Power in Asia

-

47.

Complexity Revealed, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER, supranote 11,

at 511, 526-32 [hereinafter Puchniak Multiple Faces] (discussing private benefits of
control accruing to controlling shareholders in Asian jurisdictions of China, Japan, and
Singapore); see also Gen Goto, Alan K. Koh & Dlan W. Puchniak, Diversity of Shareholder
Stewardship in Asia: Faux Convergence, 53 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 813, 832 (2020).
48.
Puchniak & Lan, supra note 7, at 268.
49.
Tan et al., supra note 7, at 67-69 (summarizing empirical studies on the
performance of Singapore state-owned enterprises). See also Dielman et al., supra note
8, at 12 (providing empirical evidence that Singapore-listed family firms "perform
significantly better" than non-family firms on returns on investment and outperform
non-family firms in Singapore and Asia generally on a range of metrics)
50.
Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions:
Understandingthe Mechanisms of State Capitalismin China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 75455 (2013); Tan et al., supranote 7, at 62-63.
See infra notes 71-72.
51.
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firms are controlling-block shareholders who possess sufficient control
either to monitor management, or, in the alternative, to intervene
52
directly in the management of their investee companies personally.
Controlling shareholders may be divided primarily into two types. The

first is family shareholders who collectively hold controlling blocks of
voting rights in many of Singapore's listed companies; Part IV will say
more about this type of shareholder. The second, which is the focus of
this Part, is the single largest player in Singapore's capital marketthe state itself.
The state holds shares and voting rights through Temasek

Holdings Private Limited (Temasek), which is a private incorporated
53
company under Singapore's Companies Act. The Singapore Minister
54
-is the sole shareholder of
for Finance-which is a body corporate
Temasek. 5 5 In turn, Temasek is the controlling shareholder of the
56
companies in its portfolio of government-linked companies (GLCs).
These GLCs include twenty-three of Singapore's largest publicly listed
companies, which comprise about 37 percent of the total capitalization
57
Moreover, Singapore's corporate
of the Singapore Exchange (SGX).
landscape is dominated by controlling shareholders, rather than
institutional shareholders, passive or otherwise. In fact, over 90
percent of Singapore's public listed companies have block shareholders
who exercise controlling power.5 8
Both state and family-controlling shareholders perform distinct
functions in Singapore's corporate environment. Notwithstanding
Temasek's status as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Government of
an
and
safeguards
constitutional
Singapore, 59 substantial
institutional architecture were put in place by the Singapore
legislature to prevent the state from using its control over Temasek to
60
What is
tunnel wealth from GLCs or otherwise abuse its power.
perhaps most striking and significant is the fact that on almost every

See Tan et al., supra note 7, at 91; Lan & Varottil, supra note 7, at 575-78.
52.
But see Puchniak & Lan, supra note 7, at 315-16.
See Puchniak & Lan, supra note 7, at 311 ("As noted above, Temasek is a
53.
private (unlisted) limited company. . . . However, Temasek voluntarily discloses a
considerable amount of information about its board and corporate governance practices
in the Temasek Review and on its official webpage.').
MINISTER FoR FINANCE (INCORPORATION) Acr (c. 183, Rev. Ed. 2014) (Sing.).
54.
(July
9,
2019),
TEMASEK
HoLDINGS
55.
Investor
Factsheet,
https://www.temasek.com.sg/content/dam/temasek-corporate/our-financials/investor[https://perma.cc/ZG3Clibrary/fact-sheet/2019_Investor FactSheetEnglish.pdf
FYED] (archived Jan, 27, 2020).
56. Tan et al., supra note 7, at 61; Puchniak & Lan, supra note 7, at 307.
Sim et al., supra note 9, at 23-24.
57.
Lan & Varottil, supra note 7, at 579.
58.
Investor Factsheet, supra note 55.
59.
SING. CONST. arts. 22C(3), 22D(5)-(6), Fifth Sched. Pt. II (amended 2017);
60.
Puchniak & Lan, supra note 7, at 307-08.
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available metric for corporate performance, Temasek and its GLCs
have been highly successful. As Puchniak and Lan observe:
Temasek's initial portfolio of government-linked companies in 1974 was worth
S$354 million, but today has grown to S$215 billion as of March 2013, with an
astonishing average annual return since its inception of 16%-significantly
outstripping the average performance of other large and mid-sized Singaporelisted companies. Likewise, empirical evidence suggests that government-linked
companies on average are significantly more profitable, better governed, and
61
receive much higher valuations than nongovernment-linked companies

Further, although Temasek is an exempt private companywhich under Singapore law is not legally required to disclose any
it voluntarily publishes an
financial information to the public 62
annual group financial summary and portfolio of performance which

has garnered it the highest possible ranking for transparency among
sovereign

wealth

funds by

the

Linaburg-Maduell

Transparency

Index.6 3
Puchniak and Lan have compared Temasek's engagement with its

GLCs as "akin to an engaged pension fund, which actively votes its
shares but does not become directly involved in the management of its
portfolio companies."6 4 However, in exceptional cases, Temasek has
actively intervened in the affairs of its investee companies when doing
so was beneficial for the company's long-term performance. A clear
example of this can be seen in a recent case where Temasek acted to
defend one of its GLCs, Olam International, which was targeted by a
short-selling campaign by Muddy Waters-an aggressive US activist
hedge fund. 65 When Muddy Waters released a spurious report alleging
accounting malfeasance at Olam, Olam's share price suffered a serious
fall. 66 Olam's downward spiral was only gradually halted when one of
Temasek's investment arms purchased sufficient shares to obtain a
majority stake in Olam through an all cash offer, and Temasek had

61.
Puchniak & Lan, supra note 7, at 316 (citing Sim et al., supra note 9, at 20).
62.
Companies (Filing of Documents) Regulations 6(1)(c)(i) (Rg. 7, Cap. 50, 2005
rev. ed.), reg 6(1)(c)(i) (Sing.) (exempting solvent exempt private companies from filing
documents in regulation 6(2)), reg 6(2), which requires companies not otherwise exempt
to file financial statements and auditors' report) (as amended by § 513/2018).
63. LINABURG-MADUELL TRANSPARENCY INDEX, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INST.
(2019),
https://www.swfinstitute.org/research/linaburg-maduell-transparency-index
[https://perma.cc/SQ42-TF2K] (archived Jan. 27, 2020) (giving Temasek Holdings the
highest rating of ten based on a set of ten indicators).
64.
Puchniak & Lan, supra note 7, at 309.
65.
Christopher Langer & David Yong, Temasek Drags Olam From Muddy
Waters to Winning $1
Billion Loan, BLOOMBERG L.P. (Nov. 3, 2015),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11 -02/temasek-drags-olam-frommuddy-waters-to-winning-1-billion-loan [https://permace/7A7Z-UAM9] (archived Jan.
27, 2020); LIM, supra note 5, at 79.
66.
Langer & Yong, supra note 65.
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publicly announced its support for Olam. 7 Market observers noted
that Temasek's actions demonstrated that "Temasek will back them to
the hilt and shake out shorts (short-sellers) and doubters at the same
time."6 8 Temasek's intervention in the Olam case demonstrates its
commitment to long-term sustainable investment and judicious
activism-while at the same time quelling the market for United
States-style activist shareholders and other long-term institutional
investors. This government-centered form of corporate governance,
which has proved extremely successful for decades, has made
Singapore an attractive potential corporate governance model for
China, as well as for many other jurisdictions around the world. 69
As with Temasek, Singapore's family-controlling shareholders
also have significant incentives-and have done so in practice-to
actively monitor management of their companies and to do so with a
70
long-term view towards promoting the company's success. In short,
Singapore's state and family-controlling shareholders have acted as
"engaged stewards" seeking to promote the long-term interests of the
companies even in the absence of the Singapore Stewardship Code.

Family-controlling shareholders and their role in corporate governance
are discussed in greater detail in Part IV.
By contrast, there is no evidence to show that institutional
investors have played anything more than a minor role in the corporate
governance of Singapore listed companies compared to state and
family-controlling shareholders. Based on a recent empirical study of
195 Singapore listed companies representing 83 percent of total
market capitalization, institutional investors held only 12 percent of
71
market capitalization weighted ownership. In addition, there is no
evidence that institutional shareholders have used their limited

shareholdings to play an active role in corporate governance. Indeed,
the role of shareholder activists, and even proxy advisory firms, has
72
been extremely limited in Singapore. Private pension funds, which
are major institutional investors in many developed economies, do not
exist as such in Singapore. Instead, Singapore's state-run equivalent
of a pension fund operates pursuant to a complex arrangement that
reinforces the government's central role in corporate governance. 73

67. Id.
68.
See Temasek Offer lifts Olam Clear of Muddy Waters, Bus. TIMES (Mar. 15,
https:/www.businesstimes.com.sg/top-stories/temasek-offer-lifts-olam-clear-of2014),
muddy-waters [https:/perma.cc/F5P5-9TBH] (archived Jan. 27, 2020) (referring to
analysis by HSBC in a research note).
69. Tan et al., supra note 7, at 91; Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 50, at 754-55.
See infra Part IV.
70.
De La Cruz et al., supra note 6, at 36-37
71.
Lan & Varottil, supra note 7, at 575-78.
72.
See, e.g., CPF Overview, CENT. PROVIDENT FUND BD., SING. (2019)
73.
https://www.cpf.gov.sg/Members/AboutUs/about-us-info/cpf-overview
[https://perma.cc/E63J-HYBT] (archived Jan. 27, 2020) (detailing how Singapore's
pension-fund equivalent is a compulsory savings plan operated by the Singapore
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This clearly sets Singapore apart from the United Kingdom (and
United States), in that it does not have a body of institutional investors
who collectively own a majority stake in listed companies, yet have
remained rationally passive.
In sum, Singapore's corporate governance context features neither
excessive risk-taking by listed companies dominated by management,
nor an absence of shareholder stewards leading to short-termism, 74
such that the concerns that drove the United Kingdom's adoption of
the 2010 Stewardship Code are absent. Institutional investors do not
dominate Singapore listed companies given that they have paltry
voting rights in comparison to their UK counterparts; 75 rather, it is
controlling shareholders that exercise effective control over Singapore
listed companies. It would thus be unrealistic to expect the solutions
that the UK Code proposes-for institutional investors to take an
active role in corporate governance-to function in the same way in
Singapore as they would in the United Kingdom. The first puzzle that
this Article will solve thus presents itself: If none of the corporate
governance problems or solutions that the UK Code was designed to
address exist in Singapore, why then did Singapore ostensibly adopt a
United Kingdom-model stewardship code?
C. Singapore'sStewardship Code: An Effective SignalingDevice
Given the practical impotence and limited relevance of
institutional investors in Singapore, the Singapore Stewardship Code
is arguably a form of "halo signaling" introduced to demonstrate
Singapore's commitment to the Anglo-American-cum-global norms of
"good" corporate governance. Here, "halo signaling" refers to the
strategic adoption of regulation to attract foreign investment

government called the Central Provident Fund ("CP"), that all working Singaporeans
and Permanent Residents are required to contribute towards. CPF funds are invested in
Special Singapore Government Securities that are issued and guaranteed by the
Singapore government. The proceeds from these bonds are pooled with other funds from
the Singapore government, and are ultimately converted to foreign assets and
transferred to the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation ("GIC"),
Singapore's sovereign wealth fund, to "manage over a long investment horizon." GIC
invests the vast majority of its assets in listed companies outside of Singapore, especially
in the US and Europe.); Is Our CPF Money Safe? Can the Government Pay All its Debt
Obligations?, MINISTRY OF FIN., SING. (2014), https://www.mof.gov.sg/policies/ournation's-reserves/Section-IV-Is-our-CPF-money-safe-Can-the-Government-pay-all-itsdebt-obligations [https://perma.cc/Y5MX-NHJU] (archived Jan. 27, 2020); Investments:
Performance, GIC (Mar. 31, 2019), https://www.gic.com.sg/investments/performance/
[https://perma.cc/445E-F8JHj (archived Jan. 27, 2020).
See Lan & Varottil, supra note 7, at 579-80 (describing the dominant
74.
corporate governance problems in Singapore, and emphasizing that such problems arise
from Singapore's concentrated shareholding landscape).
75. See id.
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notwithstanding the apparent practical irrelevance of such regulation
76
to the jurisdiction's corporate environment.
A previous example of Singapore's successful effort at "halo
signaling" was its adoption of American-style independent directors in
its Corporate Governance Code. Independent directors in the United
States are expected to monitor management to address the
agency problem arising from dispersed
shareholder-manager
shareholders, " and are thus not required to be independent from
controlling shareholders. When Singapore first adopted Americanstyle independent directors in its Corporate Governance Code, an

obvious

conundrum

arose:

given

that

controlling

shareholders

dominate Singapore's listed companies, American-style independent
directors were functionally irrelevant since they could not be expected
to effectively monitor controlling shareholders and mitigate private
benefits of control. 78 Singapore nonetheless adopted American-style
independent directors to signal its compliance with American

corporate governance norms, and its commitment to "good" corporate
79
governance in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. In
fact, Singapore had already developed domestic functional substitutes
for American-style independent directors through unique corporate
80
governance arrangements in state and family-controlled firms.
By adopting a United Kingdom-style stewardship code,
Singapore is arguably yet again engaging in a form of "halo signaling"

similar to its embrace of American-style independent directors. This
conclusion can be derived from an analysis of the text of the
Stewardship Code itself juxtaposed against the limited relevance of
institutional investors in Singapore and the reality of Singapore's
shareholder landscape (as described above). In explaining the
importance of the Singapore Stewardship Code, the preamble states:
Many countries are seeing a trend towards fragmented ownership, especially in
listed companies, with many shareholders each holding a small proportion of
shares. Coupled with increasingly shorter shareholding tenure, the ownership
mentality is arguably being eroded and replaced by a prevalent short-term view
of investment and portfolio management. Hence, the emphasis on stewardship
81
is relevant and timely.

While these corporate governance issues are relevant for
jurisdictions with dispersed shareholding environments such as the
United Kingdom and United States, they are not applicable to a
jurisdiction with a controlling-block shareholder environment, which

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

81.

Puchniak & Lan, supra note 7, at 272, 288-90, 332.
Id. at 273-78.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 288-90.
Id. at 295-317.
SINGAPORE STEWARDSHIP PRINcIPLEs, supra note 4, at 3.
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has maintained or increased the concentration of its shareholder
landscape over time, as is the case in Singapore. 82 The concerns
articulated in the code's preamble demonstrate a remarkable
disconnect with the reality of Singapore's corporate environment,
where controlling-block shareholders dominate listed companies.8 3 It
would be difficult to make out a case on the available evidence that
Singapore suffers from the corporate governance problems arising from
dispersed shareholding or short-termism.
Further, the code is also expressly addressed to "institutional
investors who are asset owners and asset managers,"8 4 and are "most
applicable to Singapore-based institutional investors with equity
holdings in Singapore-listed companies." 8 5 Yet, as explained above,
institutional investors only play a minor role in the corporate
governance of Singapore listed companies as compared to state and
family controlling shareholders. The purported concerns driving the
introduction of the code are clearly irrelevant to Singapore-and it is
their very irrelevance that makes the case that the code is being
adopted for signaling reasons, rather than to address practical

corporate governance problems in Singapore.

III.

THE

SECOND PUZZLE:

WHY DID SINGAPORE ADOPT A "TOOTHLESS"
CODE?

A. The "Toothless"Nature of the Singapore Code Revealed
At first blush, a textual analysis of the seven broad principles in
the Singapore Code would lead one to the conclusion that it is similar
to the UK Code. Indeed, all seven principles articulated in the UK Code
can find broadly parallel principles in the Singapore Code, with only a
few minor differences in wording. Thus, based on a superficial textual
analysis of the seven principles in both codes, it would be reasonable

to conclude that the Singapore Code addresses the same issues, and
promotes the same responses to those issues, as the UK Code.
However, as is often the case, the devil is in the details. A careful
examination of the preamble of the Singapore Code and a few subtle,
but critical, differences in wording in the Singapore Code's principles,
reveals that the two codes are dramatically different-and that the
Singapore Code also departs from most other codes which claim to have
been modeled on the UK Code.

82.

See Tan et al., supra note 7, at 66-67; Lan & Varottil, supra note 7, at 579-

83.
84.
85

See id.
SINGAPORE STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES, supranote 4, at 3.
Id. at 4.

80.
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First, the Singapore Code does not articulate a singular model of
stewardship by which investors should comply. The UK Code was
specifically designed to set out clear and concise rules for "good

stewardship" to encourage institutional investors to adopt these rules
or face market scrutiny if they decide to deviate from the rules and, in
turn, are required to explain the reason for their deviation. 86
Notwithstanding the Singapore Code's apparent similarity to the text

of the UK Code, the Guidance to Principle 1 of the Singapore Code
states that investors can "satisfy themselves that they adhere to their
87
own stewardship approach in carrying out investment activities."
The idea that each investor can develop their own view of stewardship,
without benchmarking it against a single settled model or code, is
significantly different from the UK Code. In other words, it is possible
for each institutional investor to adopt a version of the Singapore Code
that the investor has adapted to their own needs. Even if there is
substantial variation among the versions of the Singapore Code that
each individual investor has adopted, all of them could be considered
to have adopted or complied with the Singapore Code.
Second, axiomatically flowing from the fact that there is no single

model, the Singapore Code does not employ a "comply or explain"
approach. The preamble states that the "level of commitment [to the
principles] are matters that are left to each individual investor to
adopt, on a wholly voluntary basis." 8 This combined with the
"self-satisfaction standard" neither provides a
aforementioned
benchmark, nor a venue for disclosure, that lie at the core of a "comply
or explain" regime. Without such a regime, the Singapore Code is not
designed to significantly increase market pressure on institutional
investors to follow a singular model of "good stewardship"-which is

central to the UK Code and most other stewardship codes. Pursuant to
the UK Code, signatories promise to publish a statement of
commitment to the UK Code, and the Financial Reporting Council

(FRC) has a website with links to the individual pledges by the
further mechanism to increase marketinstitutional investors 89 -a
based pressure to encourage transparency and either adherence to or

justified deviation from the UK Code. In addition, the FRC lists and
tiers the institutional investors based on the quality of their disclosure
enhancing transparency and market
under the UK Code90 -further
model of good stewardship.
Code's
UK
the
pressure to promote
None of these features exist for the Singapore Code. Stewardship
Asia refers to institutional investors who have decided to adopt the
Singapore Code as "supporters"-as opposed to the "signatories"

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Cheffins, supra note 11, at 1005-06; Reisberg, supra note 42, 221-23.
SINGAPORE STEWARDSHIP PRINcIPLES, supra note 4, at 6.
Id. at 3.
Tiering of Stewardship Code Signatories,supra note 21.
Id.
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referred to in the UK Code. The softer language of "supporters"
suggests that Stewardship Asia wants a more relaxed regime than the

UK Code. Stewardship Asia's webpage explicitly states that the
Singapore Stewardship Code "is not enforced or audited at all." 91 While
Stewardship Asia has provided a list of such supporters on its website,
there is no information as to the degree of their compliance with the
Singapore Code. 92 There is thus no mechanism to determine if
institutional investors have complied with the Singapore Stewardship
Code or to enforce compliance where institutional investors fall short.
Third, it goes without saying that the Singapore Code-as stated

in the preamble-is entirely voluntary. 9 This reinforces the idea that
the Singapore Code is not designed to significantly alter the status quo.

It should be noted that the initial version of the UK Code was itself
entirely voluntary; the fact that the UK Code is now mandatory for
certain domestic institutional investors is unique to the United
Kingdom, 94 and is not a characteristic that is shared by other
jurisdictions that developed stewardship codes explicitly or implicitly
modelled on the initial UK Code. In this sense, although the purely
voluntary nature of the Singapore Code further distinguishes it from
the UK Code, this is in fact a red herring-as there is nothing really to
voluntarily submit to at all. In this light, when the preamble of the
Singapore Code states that the principles are "not intended to be a 'boxticking' exercise," one is left wondering whether there are, in fact, any
boxes to tick at all.9 5
Fourth, there is no regulatory agency in Singapore that is
responsible for the administration of the Singapore Code. The UK Code
was issued by the FRC, which also issued and administers the UK
Corporate Governance Code. 9 6 The FRC is a regulatory body with
enforcement power against accountants and actuaries, 97 although it is
not a regulatory body overseeing the financial markets-which is
carried out by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).9 8 By contrast,

91.
92.
("SSP'),

Singapore Stewardship Principles - Intent, supra note 20.
OrganisationsExpressing Support for the Singapore Stewardship Principles
STEWARDSHIP
ASIA
CTR.
(May
16,
2019),

https://www.stewardshipasia.com.sg/sites/default/files/SSP%2Expressions%20of%20S
upport_16%20May%202019.pdf [https://perma.c/9WB9-XVP9] (archived Jan. 31, 2020).
93.
SINGAPORE STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at 3.
94.
FCA Handbook, COBS 2.2.3, Disclosure of Commitment to the Financial
Reporting
Council's
Stewardship
Code,
FIN.
CONDUCT
AUTH,
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/COBS/2/2.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2020)
[https://perma.ce/C7Z6-ZEKX] (archived Jan. 31, 2020).
95.
SINGAPORE STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at 2-4 (emphasis added).
96.
UK STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 16.
97.
Professional
Oversight,
FIN.
REPORTING
COUNCIL,
https://www.frc.org.uk/auditors/professional-oversight
(last visited Mar. 18, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/DH5E-AA2G] (archived Jan. 31, 2020).
98. About the FCA, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://www.fca.org.uk/about/the-fca
(last visited Mar. 18, 2020) [https://perma.cc/GU9R-955T] (archived Jan. 31, 2020).
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Stewardship Asia is a private entity that only appears to be tasked
with promoting the Singapore Stewardship Code and the Family
99
Stewardship Code to investors. Stewardship Asia has no power to
regulate or enforce compliance with the Singapore Stewardship Code.
0 0 (Singapore's
Notably, neither the Monetary Authority of Singapore'
closest equivalent to the FCA), nor the Accounting and Corporate
Regulatory Authority 1 0 ' (Singapore's counterpart to the FRC) were
tasked with the administration of the Singapore Stewardship Code.
B. A Code Designed for Signaling, Not for Disruptive Change
From this analysis, one would be inclined to conclude that
Singapore's Code is either the most toothless stewardship code in the
world or is in fact not even a "code" at all, but merely publicity.
However, this misses the point. Singapore's adoption of a stewardship
code should be understood as an effort to send a signal of good corporate
governance without fundamentally upending Singapore's existingand effective-corporate governance system. The tension between
compliance with global perceptions of good corporate governance and
maintaining Singapore's unique corporate governance system was
articulated by then Minister of Finance (and present Prime Minister),

Lee Hsien Loong in 2002:
The difficulty is to strike a balance between having a set of standards which are
comparable to best practices elsewhere and having a set which is not so onerous
that, in our circumstances, we are not able to get them to work and we are

just

going through the form and the motion, rather than actually to maintain high
02
standards of corporate governance.1

Even in the absence of a stewardship code, Singapore already had
"good stewards" in the form of Temasek and family-controlling
shareholders-backed by an institutional architecture and public
enforcement mechanisms-which effectively controlled the problem of
of control. 103
benefits
private
wealth-reducing
systematic

CTR.,
ASIA
STEWARDSHIP
Us,
99. About
2020)
18,
Mar.
(last visited
https://www.stewardshipasia.com.sg/about-us
[https://perma.cc/AYV5-RESH] (archived Jan. 31, 2020).
100. Regulation, MONETARY AUTH. oF SING., https://www.mas.gov.sg/regulation
(last visited Mar. 18, 2020) [https://perma.c/7VXZSACA ] (archived Jan. 31, 2020).
101. Overview of ACRA. ACCOUNING & CoRP. REGULATORY AUTH. OF SING.,
https://www.acra.gov.sg/who-we-are/overview-of-acra (last visited Mar. 18, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/7DKN-GBVQ] (archived Jan. 31, 2020).
102. 74 Singapore Parliamentary Dehates, Budget, Ministry of Finance
at
(available
1185-86
at cols.
(May 15, 2002),
10)
(Parliament No.
https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/searchltopic?reportid=007_20020515 S0002 T0003
[https://perma.cc/EG8K-3EPU] (archived Mar. 30, 2020)).
103. See generally Puchniak & Lan, supra note 7 (arguing Singapore has
successfully and functionally maintained its efficient state-owned and family-owned
controlling-shareholder environment).
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Notwithstanding its apparent dissimilarity from the Anglo-American
idea of an "institutional investor," Temasek has branded itself as a
"steward" of its investee companies in recent years. 104 Temasek's
involvement in Singapore's Stewardship Code has also gone beyond
what one might expect from an institutional investor. A detailed
examination of public company records, press statements, and
business journalism reveals that Temasek funds Stewardship Asia,

Stewardship Asia is part of the Temasek group, and that Temasek had
a hand in Stewardship Asia's early efforts at drafting and promoting
the Singapore Stewardship Code. 105 Temasek indirectly funds
Stewardship
Asia
through
the Temasek
Trust,
Temasek's
philanthropic arm. 106 The Temasek Trust "manages 19 philanthropic
endowments and gifts from Temasek and other donors," and provides
a "sustainable 4% endowment funding rate" for entities that it
supports, which includes Stewardship Asia. 107
The relationship between Temasek and Stewardship Asia thus
sets Singapore apart from other leading jurisdictions who have adopted
stewardship codes. 108 Unlike Japan or the UK stewardship codes,
Singapore's Code is not the result of a "top-down" government led
initiative, given that the code was not developed by a government
regulator or agency and Stewardship Asia discloses no clear legal
relationship to the Singapore government. 109 However, Temasek's

104. See Our Purpose, TEMASEK, https://www.temasekcom.sg/en/who-we-are/ourpurpose.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Q8B5-LF3Z] (archived Jan.
31, 2020) ("Our Temasek Charter guides our day-to-day decision-making ... Temasek is
a trusted steward - we strive for the advancement of our communities across
generations,").

105. See Ho Ching, Transcript: Luncheon Remarks by Ho Ching at Stewardship
Asia
2018
Roundtable,
TEMASEK
n.1
(June
4,
2018),
https://www.temasekcomsg/en/news-and-views/news-room/speeches/2018/luncheonremarks-by-ho-ching-stewardship-asia-2018.html (Stewardship Asia was founded in
2011 as the Stewardship and Corporate Governance Centre which was a Temasek-led
initiative) [https://perma.c/V9AZ-8PZK] (archived Feb. 2, 2020); Ravi Menon, Corporate
Governance - Going Beyond the Rules BANK OF INT'L SETTLEMENTS (Oct l., 2012)
https://www.bisorg/review/rl21002a.pdf [https://perma.cc/68'TJ-GPH7] (archived Feb.
2, 2020); see also SHAREHOLDER STEWARDSHIP GETS A PUSH IN SINGAPORE, SING. INST.
OF
DiRS.
(2017),
https://www.sid.org.sg//images/PDFs/Publications/DirectorsBulletin2017Q1/Sharehold
er%20stewardship%20gets%20a%20push%20in%20Singapore.pdf
[https://perma.cc/73NA-QMYH] (archived Feb. 2, 2020) ("The Working Group, which
includes SID and other members and was chaired by Stewardship Asia Centre (which is
part of the Temasek Group), first met in September 2014. Most members of the Working
Group moved on to be members of the Steering Committee that will promote and
administer the SSP.")
106. TEMASEK OVERVIEW, supra note 33, at 42-43.
107. Id.
108. See Hill, supranote 1, at 507-13.
109. ACCOUNTING & CORP. REGULATORY AUTH. OF SING., supra note 3 (as
Stewardship Asia is a company limited by guarantee, the company does not issue shares,
and therefore has no shareholder. Consequently, there is no visible capital relationship
or control between Stewardship Asia and the government).
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involvement in Stewardship Asia suggests that the Singapore Code is
linked, at least in part, to the efforts of a state-controlling

shareholder-makingit distinctly different from the US, which was
driven by private institutional investors and devoid of government
involvement. 110 This could lead foreign observers to believe that
Singapore's code is ostensibly the product of a "bottom-up" initiative
similar to the US, insofar as Stewardship Asia may be deemed by those
unfamiliar with Singapore's context to be representing the interests of
institutional investors in Singapore generally."'
Thus, it was Temasek, through its close relationship with
Stewardship Asia, that spearheaded the Singapore Stewardship Code
as a form of "halo signaling" with minimal disruption to the status quo.
In influencing and promoting the Singapore Stewardship Code,
Temasek indirectly took control of a nascent regulatory space and its
future development. This allowed the state, as the most powerful
controlling shareholder, to preempt market players from creating a
more aggressive bottom-up code that might disrupt the status quo
maintained by Singapore's controlling shareholders. This form of "halo
signaling" without effecting any substantive change to institutional
investors is arguably efficient, since Singapore's corporate governance
issues do not lie with institutional investors, and Singapore overall has
demonstrated its commitment to strong corporate governance. This is
not to say that Temasek is acting against the interests of minority
shareholders, or corporate governance in general, by seizing this
regulatory space. Rather, Singapore's controlling shareholders
including Temasek have substantial incentives to function as
"stewards" of their companies and have an exceptional long-term track
record of doing so effectively. 112 Controlling shareholders of
Singapore's listed companies stand to enjoy external and private
benefits of control-at an efficient level-that motivate them to be
effective stewards, and appear to propel Singapore's highly effective
11 3
corporate governance system.
Further, the "toothless" nature of Singapore's code would arguably
facilitate compliance by major institutional investors seeking to comply
with stewardship codes in multiple jurisdictions. Given the diverse

110. Hill, supra note 1, at 507-13. It should be noted that South Korea's
Stewardship Code has also been characterized as a private "bottom-up" initiative
similar to the US. However, the South Korean government's indirect involvement in
developing its stewardship code and its role as an institutional investor through the
Korean National Pension Service makes the Korean situation unique. Thus, the Korean

government's role in stewardship in South Korea is complex. For an excellent in-depth
analysis of stewardship in South Korea, see Sang Yop Kang & Kyung-Hoon Chun,
Stewardship Code and Shareholder Activism in Korea, in GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER
STEWARDSHIP: COMPLEXITIES, CHALLENGEs AND POSIBILITIES, supra note 15.
111. See id.
112. See Tan et al., supra note 7, at 68-69, 94.
113. Puchniak, Multiple Faces, supra note 47, at 514-15.
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approaches to stewardship taken in various jurisdictions,1 1 4 one might
expect institutional investors with operations in these jurisdictions to
face considerable challenges in complying with materially different
requirements imposed by various stewardship codes. By contrast, the
fact that the Singapore Code does not unilaterally impose a single
model of stewardship, coupled with the "self-satisfaction standard"
employed by the code, 11 5 suggests that it can accommodate diverse
approaches to stewardship. This practically eliminates any compliance
challenges that institutional investors might face with regards to the
Singapore Code, and greatly facilitates the passive adoption by
institutional investors around the globe of the Singapore Codemaking it easy for them to do business in Singapore.
C. Is the State ControllingShareholder Writing the Rules of the Game

for Engagement with Itself?
Given Temasek's close relationship with Stewardship Asia, a
skeptical observer might wonder if Temasek's influence over
Stewardship Asia creates a serious conflict of interest. It would appear
that the entity writing the rules for how institutional investors should

engage with controlling shareholders (i.e., Stewardship Asia), is itself
an arm of Singapore's most powerful controlling shareholder: the
Singapore government through its wholly owned holding company
Temasek. Based on these assumptions, one might conclude that it
would be in Temasek's interests for the Singapore Code to be designed
in a way that would avoid disrupting management or promoting
powerful shareholder activism. As one might expect if Jeff Bezos and
Mark Zuckerberg wrote the rules for how BlackRock, Fidelity, and
State Street should engage with Amazon and Facebook, the code is
designed in a way to not disrupt the status quo for corporate
controllers-which in Singapore are the state and wealthy families.
These assumptions are, however, erroneous in Singapore's
context. Distinct from the US corporate governance environment in
which Amazon and Facebook exist, Temasek is located within an
institutional architecture that serves as a functional substitute for
shareholder activism. 116 As explained above, there are substantial
legal constraints that prevent undue state influence from being exerted
on Temasek's board or its subsidiary companies and ensure that
decisions made by Temasek's management are made for commercial
and not political reasons.1 1 7 Temasek has further committed itself to
refrain from being directly involved in the management of its investee

114.
115.
116.
117.

Goto et. aL, supra note 47.
SINGAPORE STEWARDSHIP PRINcIPLEs, supra note 4, at 6.
See supra Part I.B.
Id.
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companies. 118 This prevents the type of wealth-reducing private
benefits of control from being extracted by Temasek from Singapore's
state-owned enterprises-which one may expect would be extracted
from Amazon and Facebook if Bezos and Zuckerberg were themselves
the regulators and the US corporate governance environment was
devoid of shareholder activism. It may be assumed that Temasek
does-and will continue to-abide by the same constraints in relation
to Stewardship Asia. There is thus far no evidence that Temasek has
exerted, or intends to exert, any undue influence over Stewardship
Asia and the Singapore Stewardship Code or use the code to protect
the status quo purely for selfish reasons that result in inefficient
wealth tunneling.
Rather, it seems that the real reason for the enactment of the
Singapore Stewardship Code may be far more benign. By releasing the
first stewardship code through Stewardship Asia, the Singapore
government took control of this regulatory space and prevented more
bottom-up approaches of shareholder stewardship-which could have
been more unpredictable and potentially disruptive to Singapore's
successful corporate governance model-from developing. This form of
"preemptive corporate governance" has allowed the government to
maintain the existing system of corporate governance-which has
served itself and Singapore extremely well-while at the same time
allowing Singapore to maintain its position as an Asian and global
corporate governance leader by embracing "shareholder stewardship."

IV.

THE THIRD PUZZLE: WHY HAVE A STEWARDSHIP CODE FOR FAMILY

COMPANIES?
A. Singapore's Family Stewardship Code
After the release of Singapore's Stewardship Code in 2016, events
would take a surprising turn in October 2018, when Stewardship Asia
released a second "stewardship code" under the title "Stewardship
Principles for Family Businesses" (Singapore Family Stewardship
Code) 11 9 At first glance, this appears to be a version of the Singapore
Stewardship Code developed for family companies to encourage family20
controlling shareholders to be good "stewards" of their companies.'
The Singapore Family Stewardship Code is, to the best of the
authors' knowledge, the first and only one of its kind in the world.
Given the importance of family companies to Singapore, this
development does not surprise: family companies play a central role in
Singapore's economy, and up to 60.8 percent of publicly listed

118.
119.

120.

See Puchniak & Lan, supra note 7, at 307-10.
STEWARDsHIP ASIA FAMILY, supra note 26.
See id.
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companies can be classified as family firms. 121 This is in line with
broader economic trends in Asia; family firms comprise a substantial
segment of both small and medium enterprises and large public listed
firms in many Asian jurisdictions.1 2 2 By introducing the world's first

family stewardship code, Singapore has positioned itself as a corporate
governance leader for Asia and its leading economies.
Turning to the substantive provisions of the Family Stewardship
Code, it is notable that as with the Singapore Stewardship Code, the

Family Stewardship Code is not a "code" per se, but rather a set of
seven principles. These principles aim to encapsulate a way of doing
business representing "the essence of responsible and meaningful

value creation in a sustainable way to benefit stakeholders, as well as
the larger community that [family businesses] are a part of." 1 2 3
Principle 1 reads: "Driven by a sense of purpose, anchored by
values"; it encourages a family business to articulate and clearly
communicate the purpose of the family business and to implement
them in practice. 124 Principle 1 appears to contemplate that the
"purpose" of a family business should account for considerations other

than pure profit-maximization or mere commercial goals, in that it
directs family shareholders to aim for "responsible wealth creation." 1 25
This principle appears to be consistent with Principle 1 of the
Singapore Stewardship Code, which exhorts investors to "establish and
articulate their policies on stewardship responsibilities,"1 2 6 However,
unlike institutional investors who are ordinarily corporate outsiders
and who individually cannot control the company, family-controlling
shareholders are the quintessential corporate insiders who can, and do,
intervene in the company's management. 127 As compared to corporate
outsiders, as is the case for institutional investors in most UK listed
companies, family controllers are far more intimately connected with
management and are normally the best informed.1 28

121. Dielman et al., supra note 8, at 8.
122. See, e.g., Gur Aminadav & Elias Papaioannou, Corporate ControlAround the
World, 75 J. FINANCE (forthcoming June 2020) (manuscript at Table 1) (on file with
authors) (describing the shareholding structures and profiles of shareholders in listed

firms in over a hundred jurisdictions in 2012); Adrian Wooldridge, To Have and to Hold:
Special Report on Family Companies, EcONOMIST
2
(Apr.
18,
2015),
http://www.economist.com/sites/default/files/20150418_family.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7MC8-XLTA] (archived Apr. 18, 2020) ("[T]he centre of the modern
economy is shifting to parts of the world-most notably Asia-where family companies
remain dominant.").

123. STEWARDSHIP ASIA FAMILY, supra note 26, at 1.
124. Id. at 4.
125. Id.
126. SINGAPORE STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at 5.
127. See, e.g., Thio Keng Poon v. Thio Syn Pyn (2010) Sing. L.R. 143 (SGCA 16)
(Family patriarch was removed from his directorships of a number of highly successful
companies in the dairy business by his wife and children, who collectively held a majority
of shares in the companies).
128. Puchniak & Lan, supra note 7, at 298-300
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More importantly, what seems to have escaped the global
stewardship movement's attention is the fact that, when one goes
beyond a superficial textual analysis and considers the function of the
Family Stewardship Code, it is starkly different than any other
stewardship code that the authors are aware of. Principles 2 to 7 of the
Family Stewardship Code have no direct equivalent in the Singapore
Stewardship Code.
Principle 2, simply stated, is "[c]ultivate an ownership
mentality."1 2 9 This principle encourages owners and employees to take
responsibility for the business' long-term growth. In particular, it
discourages family owners from using company resources to benefit

themselves

and

encourages

family

owners

to

"embrace

the

responsibility for creating long-term social and economic value to a
wider group of stakeholders, and not just myopically focusing on family
wealth to foster ownership mentality amongst all those who play a role
in the success of the business." 130 In a similar vein, Principle 3
encourages family shareholders to "[i]ntegrate short-term and longterm perspectives," by ensuring that short-term goals are consistent
with long-term goals, and looking beyond short-term gains to focus on
13
the preservation of "intangible values such as kinship and loyalty." 1
Although their focus on long-term value over short-term profit makes
Principles 2 and 3 broadly consistent with the general thrust of
stewardship codes around the world, maintaining values of kinship
and loyalty suggests the continuing entrenchment of the family as the
13 2
corporate controller, which has no equivalent elsewhere.
Principle 4 states "[e]xpect changes, nurture agility and
3
strengthen resilience."1 3 This principle encourages family businesses
to develop skills to adapt to new challenges in a rapidly changing
business environment. Family businesses should strive to build
capacity to leverage new opportunities, and to refrain from passively
clinging on to traditional practices. 134 This reinforces the idea of
keeping the family business viable in the long run, which would
ultimately preserve the future for the family as the corporate

controller.
Principle 5 emphasizes the importance of nonfamily participants
and stakeholders and exhorts family shareholders to "[e]mbrace
inclusiveness and build strong stakeholder relationships." 135 This
principle encourages family businesses to maintain family unity and
develop longstanding relationships with internal and external
In particular, this principle encourages family
stakeholders.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

STEWARDsHIP ASIA FAMILY, supra note 26, at 4.
See id:
Id. at 5.
See Hill, supra note 1, at 512-13.
STEWARDSHIP ASIA FAMILY, supra note 26, at 5.

Id.
Id. at 6.
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businesses to engage with stakeholders through corporate law and
governance mechanisms such as annual general meetings and
voluntary disclosure reports,1 36 Board diversity is also singled out as a
good practice for family businesses; this is particularly significant in
Singapore's context given that many family companies have
traditionally operated according to traditional Asian family values that
emphasizes control by an autocratic patriarch, "who enlists his
children and siblings (women usually excepted) to assist in the family
business."13 7 Despite this call for diversity, there is nothing to suggest
that the family should divest its controlling stake in the company to
external organizations or individuals. Rather, the focus is on nurturing
a strong stakeholder culture to sustain family-controlled companies for
the future.

Principle

6

appears

to

reflect

environmental,

social

and

governance concerns; it states "[d]o well, do good, do right; contributing

to community." ' 3 8 This principle promotes the importance of "noneconomic wealth," such as "social capital, communal ties, family
reputation and core values."'3 Once again, it appears that the Family
Stewardship Code is attempting to develop a model for long-term
family control where reputation rather than shareholder activism is a
significant check on the extraction of private benefits of control in
family companies.
Principle 7 is arguably the most interesting provision in the
Family Stewardship Code. It states simply: "Be mindful of
succession."14 0 This principle recognizes the importance of timely and
planned succession to not only family successors, but also the utility of
external expertise and professional assistance. This principle is crucial
because it reveals that while the concept of "stewardship" espoused in

the Family Stewardship Code appears to be consistent with that
articulated in other stewardship codes-especially the code's focus on
long-term investment and stakeholder considerations-it differs in
critical ways. First, unlike the version of "stewardship" employed in
the UK Code-which envisions institutional shareholders playing a
more active role in the corporate governance of their investee
companies 141 -Singapore's
Family Stewardship Code does not
contemplate complete divestment of control to nonfamily shareholders,
but rather the continued participation of family successors groomed for
the task. The Singapore Family Stewardship Code does not appear to
actively encourage or facilitate the involvement of institutional
investors or shareholder activists in Singapore family companies. For

136. See id.
137. Samantha S. Tang, CorporateDivorce in Family Companies, 1 LLOYD'S MAR.
& COM. L.Q. 19, 24 (2018) (emphasis added).
138. STEWARDsHIP ASIA FAMILY, supra note 26; at 6.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 7.
141. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 16, at 8.
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example, there is nothing in the family stewardship code which
contemplates collective action by institutional investors-or indeed
any action by institutional investors at all.
Further, the Family Stewardship Code takes a substantially
different approach to compliance than the UK Code-and most other
stewardship codes. The Family Stewardship Code provides guidance
on how these principles may be put into practice but does not rely on
any form of "comply or explain" or any other mechanism to place any
market pressure on family controllers. Per the Family Stewardship
Code, these principles "aim to articulate the mindset and attitudes, as
well as behaviors and practices that would foster success, significance

and sustainability

for

[family businesses]"

142

This

specifically

contemplates the longevity of the family as the long-term corporate
controller, without contemplating that the family might divest control
or governance power to institutional investors or any other
stakeholder. As with the Singapore Stewardship Code, the Family
Stewardship Code neither demands evidence of compliance from
supporters who voluntarily "sign up" to the code, nor does it provide
any mechanism for shareholders or external regulatory agencies to

monitor compliance with the code. 143 This represents a substantial
deviation from the compliance requirements provided in stewardship
codes from other jurisdictions, including the UK Code.

B. Stewardship for Family Controllers:A Meaningful Approach for a
Truly Asian Problem
The salience of the Family Stewardship Code in Singapore is

underscored by the significant incentives that family-controlling
shareholders have to act as "stewards" of their companies by
monitoring and directly intervening in the company's management to
promote the long-term success of the family business. Singapore family
firms have a strong culture that encourages family controllers to
preserve and pass on the family business to future generations of the

controlling family or families.' 4 4 These cultural norms also link the
family's reputation to the success of the family business, 145 giving
controllers significant incentives to monitor or directly manage the
family firm to promote its long-term success. While tunneling in family
firms may be a concern in other jurisdictions, previous research by one
of the authors posited "that Singaporean-Chinese family corporate
culture provides at least a partial functional substitute for effective

142. STEWARDsHIP ASIA FAMILY, supra note 26, at 2.
143. See id.
144. See Wilson Ng & John Roberts, "Helpingthe Family"s The Mediating Role of
Outside Directors in Ethnic Chinese Family Firms, 60 HUM. REL. 285, 287. 306-07
(2007); Dielman et al., supra note 8, at 29, 31; Puchniak & Lan, supra note 7, at 302.
145. See Ng & Roberts, supra note 144, at 305.
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monitoring of family member controllers by truly independent
directors in family firms in Singapore." 146 There is also anecdotal
evidence that family controllers are reluctant to engage in obvious
wealth tunneling for fear of being caught by Singapore's efficient public
regulators. 147
Beyond Singapore, family-controlled firms also play a central role
in many Asian jurisdictions. Examples of leading family businesses in
Asia include Samsung (South Korea),14 8 Suntory Holdings (Japan), 149
CK Hutchinson Holdings (Hong Kong),1 50 and Far East Organisation
(Singapore). 1 5 ' In this context, Singapore's development of the Family
Stewardship Code is both salient and timely, in that Singapore is the
first jurisdiction to develop a stewardship code specifically directed at
a business model widely adopted in Asia that faces corporate
governance challenges not addressed by the UK Code-or indeed any
other stewardship code. The Family Stewardship Code's Asian focus is
evident given Stewardship Asia's reliance on Asian examples in its

promotion
(Singapore),

of
152

(Philippines), 1 5 4

the

code,

including

the

Banyan Tree Group
153 the Lopez Group
Diamond Hotel (Philippines),1 55 and the Mayapada
Hoshi

Ryokan

(Japan),

146. Puchniak & Lan, supra note 7, at 303.
147. Id. at 304.
148. Morten Bennedsen & Brian Henry, Samsung's Lee Family Succession Crisis
Shows the Importance of Long-Term Planning, S. CHINA MORNING POsT (Oct. 6, 2017),
https://www.semp.com/business/article/2114120/samsungs-lee-family-succession-crisisshows-importance-long-term-planning [https://perma.cc/8LKP-RW7W] (archived Jan.
31, 2020).
149. The controlling shareholder of Suntory Holdings Limited (the holding
company of the Suntory Group), which as of Dec. 31, 2018 held 89.50% of Suntory
Holdings, is Kotobuki Fud6san (Kotobuki Realty) Co. Ltd, an asset management
company controlled by the Saji and Torii families that founded Suntory. See SUNTORY
HOLDINGS LTD., 2018-NEN 12-GATSU-KI: KESSAN JOKYO (IFRS) (RENKETSU) (2018 4{12
A0 & PL M & ( i M )) [FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF DECEMBER 2018 (IFRS)
(CONSOLIDATED)]
8-9
(2018),
https://www.suntorysco.jp/news/article/mt_items/SBF0807.pdf
[https://perma.c/86XVHCXW] (archived Feb. 4, 2020) (reporting that Kotobuki Realty's shareholding and that
Suntory Holdings' Chairman (Saji Nobutada) and Vice-Chairman (Torii Shingo) also
hold positions as Chairman and Vice-Chairman of Kotobuki Realty, and that previously
when they served respectively as Suntory's President and Vice-President, also served as
President and Vice-President of Kotobuki concurrently); JapansSuntory Mulling IPO,
NIKKEI ASiAN REV. (July 28, 2015) https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Japan-s-Suntorymulling-IPO [https://perma.cc/E3EL-49RD] (archived Feb. 4, 2020) (describing Kotobuki
as the Saji and Torii clans' asset management company).

150. Stewardship Principles for Family Businesses, STEWARDSHIP ASIA CTR.
https://www. stewardshipasia.com. sg/stewardship-principles-family-businesses
[https://perma.cc/R7YB-CHVL] (archived Feb 4. 2020).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.

2020]

SINGAPORE'S PUZZLING EMBRACE OF SHAREHOLDER STEWARDSHIP

1019

Group (Indonesia). 156 Further, Stewardship Asia also recently
launched its Family Business Campaign (FB77) in September 2018 to
promote the Family Stewardship Code to Japan, Philippines,
157
The Family
Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Australia, and China.
Stewardship Code and FB77 thus demonstrate Singapore's ambition of
reinforcing its position as a corporate governance leader in Asia-and

even perhaps making Singapore the standard bearer for a new Asian
model of corporate governance.
Given the centrality of family businesses to Asia-and the
growing interest in stewardship as an avenue for corporate governance
in such companies-the absence of family companies from stewardship
codes in other leading jurisdictions is a significant omission. This could
arise from an excessively narrow perception of the problems sought to
be resolved by stewardship in such jurisdictions. Singapore's Family
Stewardship Code thus represents a meaningful contribution to the
growing global stewardship movement and an increased focus on
corporate governance in Asia.

V. SINGAPORE-STYLE

STEWARDSHIP: A SUCCESSFUL SECRET

Stewardship in Singapore is far more complex than it appears at
first blush. Indeed, a superficial textual analysis of the seven principles
in the Singapore Code would reasonably lead one to believe that
stewardship in Singapore is a near carbon copy of the original UK
Code. 15 8 The mention of the growing corporate governance problems
arising from dispersed shareholding and short-termism in the
preamble of the Singapore Code could rightly leave an outside observer
to conclude that the corporate governance problems which drove the
adoption of the UK Code and Singapore Code were nearly identical.
The solution suggested by the seven principles of both codesmotivating institutional investors to be "good stewards" by using their
collective voting power to monitor management-suggests that both
codes propose the same solution to their ostensibly common corporate
governance problems. Foreign readers of academic and popular reports
that appear to assume that the Singapore Code is merely a transplant
of the UK Code may come away with the mistaken impression that the
59
UK model of stewardship has been transplanted to Singapore.1 In
short, it is entirely understandable why a foreign observer viewing
stewardship in Singapore based on a superficial textual analysis,

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. For a more sophisticated textual analysis of stewardship codes, see
Katelouzou & Siems, supra note 15. However, even based on this more sophisticated
textual analysis (which does not examine the text of the Singapore Family Stewardship
Code), the Singapore Stewardship Code is seen as similar to the UK Code.
159. LIM, supra note 5.
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would perceive the evolution of stewardship in Singapore to be
evidence of the UK model going global.
The fact that foreign observers might reasonably conclude that
Singapore has embraced the apparently United Kingdom-driven
global stewardship movement is not an accident, but by design. As this
Article has explained, Singapore has a strong incentive to maintain its
position as a corporate governance leader by sending a signal that it
has embraced the UK model of stewardship, which has become a global
indication of good corporate governance. 160 The fact that so many
academic and popular reports assume Singapore has done this is

evidence that it has achieved this goal.
However, this is merely the start, not the end, of the Singapore
stewardship story. In many respects, stewardship in Singapore turns
the UK model on its head and appears to be uniquely Singaporean.
Singapore does not have the corporate governance problems that
sparked the UK Code, and the impotence of institutional investors in
Singapore means that the UK stewardship solution is similarly absent
in Singapore.
A closer examination of the Singapore Code reveals that it does
not contemplate a single model of stewardship, but rather it allows
16 1
Both
investors to develop their own understanding of stewardship.
of Singapore's stewardship codes are merely flexible principles rather
than actual stewardship codes and there is no easy way to determine
which institutions have chosen to implement these principles because
there is no central repository of information to facilitate a true "comply
or explain" approach"-as such an approach has not been adopted in
Singapore. 162 Further, there is no body with any regulatory power
whatsoever to disseminate or enforce the Singapore Code.1 6 3 Viewed
through a UK lens, stewardship in Singapore may be seen as a sham
or failure based on this granular and contextual analysis.
To the contrary, this Article suggests that both of Singapore's
stewardship codes have been decidedly successful. Through its
implementation of not one, but two, stewardship codes, Singapore has
reinforced its position as a corporate governance leader that embraces
global norms of good corporate governance. 164 By developing the
concept of "family stewardship," Singapore has also positioned itself as
a stewardship leader in a way that resonates with a seminal corporate
governance problem and solution in Asia, which may potentially allow
it to become a leader in an emerging movement of Asian corporate

160. Dionysia

Katelouzou

SHAREHOLDER STEWARDSHIP:
note 15.

161.
162.
163.
164.

& Dan

W.

Puchniak,

Introduction, in GLOBAL

COMPLEXITIES, CHALLENGES AND POsSIBILITIES, supra

See supra Part IIA.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part III.C.
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governance. 165 The timing of this development is significant
regionalism appears to be replacing globalism as a megatrend.

1021
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Importantly, Singapore has been able to position itself as a leader
in the global stewardship movement without disrupting its highly
successful state-controlled and family-controlled system of corporate
Counterintuitively, Singapore's unique brand of
governance,

stewardship seems to have reinforced-rather than disrupted-its
state-controlled and family-controlled system of corporate governance.
It would have been beyond the wildest imaginations of the original
architects of the UK Code that shareholder stewardship would be
successfully used as a mechanism for entrenching state control and

family control over corporate governance. Nevertheless, Singapore's
to stewardship may very well be a secret to
Singapore's continued market-leading corporate governance success.
unique approach

165.

See supra Part IV.B.
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